I lost my essay.
EDIT: Wait, no. Found it:
Since the United States was first established and it first encountered the Muslim world, the two have met with great strife. In the article “The Fallacy of Greivance-based Terrorism,” Lee explains that the first encounter with jihadists that set the precedent for American interaction with the Muslim world occurred shortly after the American revolution. From the first conflict and attempt at resolution through treaty, the United States attempted to take a secular position and ignore the basic system of Islamic culture. This obviously led to some conflicts in attempting to negotiate. Furthermore, most of the former Ottoman empire had continued to reject most Enlightenment ideals, thus leading to a larger communication gap with the West. These radically different cultures conflict almost inherently and lead to a relationship that has been full of animosity since the beginning.
Near the turn of the century, the Barbary pirates were causing a large problem for the United States, blocking their trade routes, stealing their supplies and imprisoning sailors. The founding fathers of the American Revolution were still struggling to establish commerce and freedom of action with the international community. For most of the Barbary states, a peaceful negotiation was not an option, as the pirates attempted to claim their religious right to jihad and claim infidels as slaves. This, in stark contrast to Enlightenment ideals of human rights led to a standstill in compromise. Eventually, the United States took military action to assert its dominance in the seas. Maintaining a completely secular approach, we remained distant to the Muslim world.
Throughout the 19th century, the United States found itself in conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, and attempted to take the secular liberal path each time. American attempts at neutrality went unappreciated, as the Ottoman empire continued to attack ships. This led to more American intervention in the form of missionaries and aid being sent to the Middle East to protect the Jewish population that was under persecution. Unfortunately, most missionaries were captured and conflict with the Muslim world arose once more. Only in the 20th century, did Woodrow Wilson acknowledge the differences between the two cultures and actively try to be understanding of their religious background during negotiations.
Even if the United States understands that the heart of the conflict lies in cultural differences, there is still much ground to be made in forming a positive relationship with the Muslim world. The Ottoman empire could not negotiate completely with the United States due to their rejection of Enlightenment ideals. Furthermore, their natural spite for democracy and human rights philosophy is difficult to overcome. Lee states that many Muslim states outright reject Enlightenment ideals, despite it being detrimental to the standard of life of its people as well as to the economy of the state. This rejection is due to the close association with Western democracies to sin and corruption. Osama bin Laden stated that it is the capitalist mechanism that soldiers are dying for when they fight for America. The current culture of these countries does not understand the economic principles behind capitalism and believes that there is no way for the righteous to flourish. While one culture completely opposes the very nature of another, compromise becomes difficult.
After acknowledging that the United States has always had a poor relationship with the Muslim World due the radically different cultures, Lee proposes some possible solutions. Diplomacy, though it has been ineffective in the long run, can help America make great strides in its relationship with the Muslim world. The divide is not solely one of secularism versus one with a fanatical religious base; it is also one of a conflict between a society that values the rights and life of the individual, compared to one that sees killing infidels as the path to paradise. Lee proposes that we support the teachings of less radical Islamic beliefs which are being taught by various leaders in the Middle East. Through such efforts, we can only hope to close the gap between our two world and reconcile for the benefit of both cultures.
Sorry for the weird formatting. My html exploded.
Saturday, January 9, 2010
Friday, January 8, 2010
On Terrorism, Part I
Coincidentally, Juan and I both had terrorism as one of the topics for our final essays in our international relations classes. Since they offer contrasting takes on the issue, it might be interesting to see them side by side. Here is mine:
In a stunningly short period of time, global terrorism has emerged to become the greatest security threat facing the United States today. Although Islamist radicalism, the driving force behind the most globally salient terrorist organizations, has been on the rise for decades, it was not until September 11, 2001 that Americans became acutely aware of terrorism’s deadly capacity. This phenomenon can be perplexing at first glance. Relative to the forces that opposed America in the 20th century—those of fascism and communism—our current foes seem almost laughably impotent. Unlike Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, Islamist terrorist organizations do not command massive economies or industrialized armies. Instead, they are scattered across the world, recruiting their forces from the local population and relying on the sponsorship of sympathetic states and other entities. It is this amorphousness, this perception of eerie omnipresence, which makes terrorism more frightening of a challenge than anything the United States has faced before. Because terrorist organizations are non-state actors, they can neither be deterred conventionally nor bound to international institutions. This unprecedented problem requires a reassessment of classic assumptions, such as those made by realist and liberal schools of thought. To address the issue of global terrorism, policy-makers must take a constructivist approach to identify the causes of Islamist radicalism and prescribe long-term stabilizing solutions within the social construct of Islamic societies.
Among the myriad of issues facing the United States, Islamist terrorism demands the highest priority because it is a direct and unequivocal threat to the United States. Organizations like al-Qaeda have explicitly stated their intent to kill Americans wherever they are found, and unless the U.S. government takes active precautionary and preventive measures, citizens both domestic and abroad are vulnerable to attacks. Not only does the United States have the greatest reason to combat terrorism, it also has the greatest responsibility to. The U.S. is the only nation with the resources and force projection capability to thwart and root out terrorists in all corners of the world, and however adept our allies may be at creating environmental and economic policy, they cannot tackle terrorism without American leadership. And at the risk of echoing clichéd apocalyptic predictions of bygone eras, we must fight Islamist terrorism because it promotes an oppressive ideology that, if embraced, will create societies as harmful to their own people as they are to other societies.
All these reasons are only convincing if one truly appreciates terrorism’s capacity for wreaking havoc on civilian populations. September 11 was a catastrophic tragedy, but nothing even close to its level of sophistication and destructiveness has occurred on American soil since. There are various explanations for this hiatus, but the absence of deadly strikes domestically obscures the ease with which they may happen. As the recent attack on Fort Hood by a single gunman demonstrated, small arms have a tremendous capacity for murder. If a solitary assailant, one without logistic support or any strategic motivation, is able to carry out such carnage, a mildly competent terrorist cell in America will be able to inflict much greater damage at minimal cost. Terrorists can also be aided by crude weapons like dirty bombs, conventional explosives that spread radioactive material which, while not directly destructive, can paralyze a population center and incite panic. One must also not ignore the possibility that terrorists may acquire more potent biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons in the future. If al-Qaeda is ignored, we risk immediate and long-term threats that will not only be difficult to mitigate but also potentially crippling to our national sense of security.
A willingness to prioritize the issue of terrorism must be coupled with a clear understanding of its causes. To discern these complex ideas, the lens of constructivism is especially well-suited. Constructivism takes the perspective that the behavior of people and states “is premised on their understanding of the world around them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they participate.” Therefore, it provides an alternative to purely materialistic assumptions, which cannot comprehensively explain the motivation of terrorists, by elucidating the ideas that give meaning to material factors. A materialist interpretation of Islamist terrorism can explain why, among the Western nations that Islamic Middle Eastern societies bear grievances against, the United States is the single most prominent target, for it has the largest and most involved presence in the Middle East. However, this interpretation alone does not explain why such grievances exist toward the U.S. in the first place. After all, although America has a significant military presence in the Japanese islands, no violent Japanese organization has materialized against the United States. A constructivist examination of this issue would yield a hypothesis based on the notion that Islamic societies form their perceptions of the U.S. from a pattern of social interactions. Because Japan considers the U.S. an ally and a friend in a mutually beneficial relationship, it does not resent U.S. occupation. In contrast, Middle Eastern societies have not fared so well in their interactions with the West. The Middle East’s encounter with modernization, which is viewed as a product of the West, has yielded obscenely rich and corrupt aristocrats while failing to introduce liberal concepts that have propelled East Asian nations to genuine economic and social progress. American intervention, especially its support of Israel, is therefore seen as a reincarnation of imperialistic colonialism. A study of this pattern of interactions and its effects can reveal clues for a foreign policy that can redress the failures of the past and reshape relations between the Western world and Islamic nations in the Middle East.
Aside from social interactions, constructivism can also identify the construction of states and state interests as factors in behavior. We can apply this framework to the construction of non-state actors like terrorist organizations to understand their goals. Islamist groups like al-Qaeda believe that sovereignty belongs to God alone, and thus aim to impose shar’ia—Islamic law—on all Muslims. Thus, Michael Scott Doran characterized September 11 as an attempt to provoke an aggressive American response and polarize the Islamic world between the faithful umma—Islamic societies—and the United States and its Muslim allies. U.S. military action, which is bound to cause heavy Muslim casualties, will exacerbate tensions between America and the Middle East. Bin Laden can use this as political ammunition against what he views as apostate Islamic nations and thereby facilitate his vision of an Islamist revolution. Aggression against the United States is therefore a means to the ultimate end of Islamist totalitarianism.
An application of both the understanding of Middle Eastern perception of the United States and the motivations of terrorist organizations leads to several potential and complementary solutions to the issue of global Islamic terrorism. A crucial first step is to mitigate resentment toward America. Policy-makers should take concerns from the Islamic world seriously and adopt a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is possible that Israel’s relinquishment of some settlements could lower Middle Eastern hostility, but even if it does not, we can rest assured that opportunity and peace have been restored to millions of displaced Palestinian. Furthermore, the U.S. should attach conditions to its support of Middle Eastern regime and press for greater liberalization of the political process. If Islamists have peaceful and democratic venues for political participation, we may see a decline in terrorist activities. Furthermore, the U.S. should dispel the negative myths about America that have been perpetuated by Islamist propaganda. This response should not be counter-propaganda; rather, it needs to be an honest and accessible forum that utilizes highly-trained spokespeople and all forms of media. Earnest diplomatic engagement between America and the Muslim masses can heal many wounds.
These approaches might be appalling to certain realists. They might argue that terrorists by and large remain unharmed in the process, and would be able to fearlessly continue their assaults on the United States. However, the constructivist methodology outlined above have the potential of significantly reducing motivations for terrorism because they are so minimally disruptive to Islamic society. If the U.S. refrains from overt breaches of sovereignty, like its invasions of Afghanistan and Iran, it can chip away at the casus belli that Islamists extremists have tried so hard to establish. When America no longer seems like the Great Satan, terrorist organizations will find fewer and fewer recruits with whom to bolster their ranks. At that point, it matters little that perpetrators of terrorist acts remain alive and well; they will have become largely irrelevant. When their ideology is no longer accepted by Muslims, their material resources will vanish as well.
Of course, these are very optimistic predictions, and the solution to terrorism provided is an incredibly difficult one to implement successfully. But given the failures of previous attempts at curbing Islamist terrorism, we must give the constructivist approach the chance it deserves. Global terrorism is the paramount threat to the U.S. today, and constructivism alone can provide real and long-term solutions to this problem.
In a stunningly short period of time, global terrorism has emerged to become the greatest security threat facing the United States today. Although Islamist radicalism, the driving force behind the most globally salient terrorist organizations, has been on the rise for decades, it was not until September 11, 2001 that Americans became acutely aware of terrorism’s deadly capacity. This phenomenon can be perplexing at first glance. Relative to the forces that opposed America in the 20th century—those of fascism and communism—our current foes seem almost laughably impotent. Unlike Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, Islamist terrorist organizations do not command massive economies or industrialized armies. Instead, they are scattered across the world, recruiting their forces from the local population and relying on the sponsorship of sympathetic states and other entities. It is this amorphousness, this perception of eerie omnipresence, which makes terrorism more frightening of a challenge than anything the United States has faced before. Because terrorist organizations are non-state actors, they can neither be deterred conventionally nor bound to international institutions. This unprecedented problem requires a reassessment of classic assumptions, such as those made by realist and liberal schools of thought. To address the issue of global terrorism, policy-makers must take a constructivist approach to identify the causes of Islamist radicalism and prescribe long-term stabilizing solutions within the social construct of Islamic societies.
Among the myriad of issues facing the United States, Islamist terrorism demands the highest priority because it is a direct and unequivocal threat to the United States. Organizations like al-Qaeda have explicitly stated their intent to kill Americans wherever they are found, and unless the U.S. government takes active precautionary and preventive measures, citizens both domestic and abroad are vulnerable to attacks. Not only does the United States have the greatest reason to combat terrorism, it also has the greatest responsibility to. The U.S. is the only nation with the resources and force projection capability to thwart and root out terrorists in all corners of the world, and however adept our allies may be at creating environmental and economic policy, they cannot tackle terrorism without American leadership. And at the risk of echoing clichéd apocalyptic predictions of bygone eras, we must fight Islamist terrorism because it promotes an oppressive ideology that, if embraced, will create societies as harmful to their own people as they are to other societies.
All these reasons are only convincing if one truly appreciates terrorism’s capacity for wreaking havoc on civilian populations. September 11 was a catastrophic tragedy, but nothing even close to its level of sophistication and destructiveness has occurred on American soil since. There are various explanations for this hiatus, but the absence of deadly strikes domestically obscures the ease with which they may happen. As the recent attack on Fort Hood by a single gunman demonstrated, small arms have a tremendous capacity for murder. If a solitary assailant, one without logistic support or any strategic motivation, is able to carry out such carnage, a mildly competent terrorist cell in America will be able to inflict much greater damage at minimal cost. Terrorists can also be aided by crude weapons like dirty bombs, conventional explosives that spread radioactive material which, while not directly destructive, can paralyze a population center and incite panic. One must also not ignore the possibility that terrorists may acquire more potent biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons in the future. If al-Qaeda is ignored, we risk immediate and long-term threats that will not only be difficult to mitigate but also potentially crippling to our national sense of security.
A willingness to prioritize the issue of terrorism must be coupled with a clear understanding of its causes. To discern these complex ideas, the lens of constructivism is especially well-suited. Constructivism takes the perspective that the behavior of people and states “is premised on their understanding of the world around them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they participate.” Therefore, it provides an alternative to purely materialistic assumptions, which cannot comprehensively explain the motivation of terrorists, by elucidating the ideas that give meaning to material factors. A materialist interpretation of Islamist terrorism can explain why, among the Western nations that Islamic Middle Eastern societies bear grievances against, the United States is the single most prominent target, for it has the largest and most involved presence in the Middle East. However, this interpretation alone does not explain why such grievances exist toward the U.S. in the first place. After all, although America has a significant military presence in the Japanese islands, no violent Japanese organization has materialized against the United States. A constructivist examination of this issue would yield a hypothesis based on the notion that Islamic societies form their perceptions of the U.S. from a pattern of social interactions. Because Japan considers the U.S. an ally and a friend in a mutually beneficial relationship, it does not resent U.S. occupation. In contrast, Middle Eastern societies have not fared so well in their interactions with the West. The Middle East’s encounter with modernization, which is viewed as a product of the West, has yielded obscenely rich and corrupt aristocrats while failing to introduce liberal concepts that have propelled East Asian nations to genuine economic and social progress. American intervention, especially its support of Israel, is therefore seen as a reincarnation of imperialistic colonialism. A study of this pattern of interactions and its effects can reveal clues for a foreign policy that can redress the failures of the past and reshape relations between the Western world and Islamic nations in the Middle East.
Aside from social interactions, constructivism can also identify the construction of states and state interests as factors in behavior. We can apply this framework to the construction of non-state actors like terrorist organizations to understand their goals. Islamist groups like al-Qaeda believe that sovereignty belongs to God alone, and thus aim to impose shar’ia—Islamic law—on all Muslims. Thus, Michael Scott Doran characterized September 11 as an attempt to provoke an aggressive American response and polarize the Islamic world between the faithful umma—Islamic societies—and the United States and its Muslim allies. U.S. military action, which is bound to cause heavy Muslim casualties, will exacerbate tensions between America and the Middle East. Bin Laden can use this as political ammunition against what he views as apostate Islamic nations and thereby facilitate his vision of an Islamist revolution. Aggression against the United States is therefore a means to the ultimate end of Islamist totalitarianism.
An application of both the understanding of Middle Eastern perception of the United States and the motivations of terrorist organizations leads to several potential and complementary solutions to the issue of global Islamic terrorism. A crucial first step is to mitigate resentment toward America. Policy-makers should take concerns from the Islamic world seriously and adopt a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is possible that Israel’s relinquishment of some settlements could lower Middle Eastern hostility, but even if it does not, we can rest assured that opportunity and peace have been restored to millions of displaced Palestinian. Furthermore, the U.S. should attach conditions to its support of Middle Eastern regime and press for greater liberalization of the political process. If Islamists have peaceful and democratic venues for political participation, we may see a decline in terrorist activities. Furthermore, the U.S. should dispel the negative myths about America that have been perpetuated by Islamist propaganda. This response should not be counter-propaganda; rather, it needs to be an honest and accessible forum that utilizes highly-trained spokespeople and all forms of media. Earnest diplomatic engagement between America and the Muslim masses can heal many wounds.
These approaches might be appalling to certain realists. They might argue that terrorists by and large remain unharmed in the process, and would be able to fearlessly continue their assaults on the United States. However, the constructivist methodology outlined above have the potential of significantly reducing motivations for terrorism because they are so minimally disruptive to Islamic society. If the U.S. refrains from overt breaches of sovereignty, like its invasions of Afghanistan and Iran, it can chip away at the casus belli that Islamists extremists have tried so hard to establish. When America no longer seems like the Great Satan, terrorist organizations will find fewer and fewer recruits with whom to bolster their ranks. At that point, it matters little that perpetrators of terrorist acts remain alive and well; they will have become largely irrelevant. When their ideology is no longer accepted by Muslims, their material resources will vanish as well.
Of course, these are very optimistic predictions, and the solution to terrorism provided is an incredibly difficult one to implement successfully. But given the failures of previous attempts at curbing Islamist terrorism, we must give the constructivist approach the chance it deserves. Global terrorism is the paramount threat to the U.S. today, and constructivism alone can provide real and long-term solutions to this problem.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
On Pascal's Wager
We start off with a brief summary of Pascal's Wager to establish proper foundation for its dissection and analysis.
Pascal's Wager makes the following assumptions:
1) if God exists, He will reward those who believe in Him
2) God's reward is infinite
3) there is nothing to lose in believing in God
4) there is an equal chance of God existing and God not existing
With such assumptions we can derive the following calculus to find the expected value of this wager:
(reward x probability God exists) - (cost x probability God does not exist) = expected value of Pascal's Wager
Let reward be infinite and cost be zero. Even if assumption 4 is not true, the expected value will be infinite as long as the probability of God's existence is not zero. Hence it is rational, from the perspective of decision theory, to believe in God.
I will briefly sum up some noteworthy counter-arguments before offering my own. A common rebuttal criticizes the wager as a false dilemma in that it offers only the following possibilities:
1) a benevolent God exists and rewards according to belief
2) a benevolent God does not exist
This dichotomy precludes the possibilities that God is malevolent, or has an alternative system of reward. But as Pascal structures his analysis from a Christian viewpoint, this argument is moot.
Another criticism is that Pascal neglects to factor in all religions, and any possible religion, into this decision matrix. Since Pascal had obviously discounted the validity of all other religions, this argument does not serve to undermine Pascal's framework.
I seek to find errors in Pascal's Wager within his own established paradigm. After some brief analysis, I formulated the following premises:
1) the cost is not zero
2) the cost is not fixed
3) an infinite expected value automatically invokes the law of diminishing marginal utility
Premise 1
We will examine Premise 1 from a Christian perspective. There are few Christians that would deny the potential drawbacks of a Christian lifestyle. Doctrinal obedience places restrictions on potentially anything from diet to social conduct, depending on one's interpretation of the Bible. Furthermore, belief itself might exact a social cost in the form of religious persecution. While this is no longer as salient as during the founding years of Christianity, it still exists in areas of the Middle East, where conversion to non-Islamic religions provoke violence or even murder.
John Milton explicitly mentions the sacrifices of Christianity in Paradise Lost (I have not read the book. This tidbit of info I owe to Matthew Lu of Free Exchange):
"Of servitude, to serve whom God ordains, / Or Nature; God and Nature bid the same, / When he who rules worthiest, and excels / Them whom he governs. This is servitude."
Belief of God is servitude under God. This is cost.
Premise 2
In addition to the daily costs of Christian belief, we must factor in the opportunity cost: what one may gain if one does not believe in God. The opportunity cost of belief is variable. Since prevalent Christian doctrine makes no demands on the time of conversion, one may become choose belief at any point in one's lifetime to claim salvation.
If one enjoys behavior contrary to Christian doctrine (e.g. sodomy, adultery, and other fun things), then one would delay conversion until the last possible instant so as to minimize the opportunity cost. Therefore, precluding sudden deaths, there is no incentive in Pascal's framework to believe in God until one reaches the deathbed. Following the logic of decision theory, the wager Pascal construed as being supremely imperative essentially begs for procrastination.
Premise 3
Even if we accept both Premises 1 and 2, there is still the unaddressed question of the infinite expected value. No amount of trickery with cost and opportunity cost will produce a tangible effect on something infinite.
We therefore invoke the law of diminishing marginal utility. This law states that quantitative increase in an item of value will eventually reach a point where additional items will yield progressively less value.
Take for example a gift of roses. Although pragmatically wasteful, a bouquet of roses is lovely and symbolically meaningful. Two bouquets might be even better. Three bouquets is pushing it. By the time your romantic interest receives the ten thousandth bouquet of roses, he/she will be sick of them and throwing them away as soon as they are delivered.
We can create a new scenario to fit the form of a wager. Let us suppose you are asked to fund a fledgling company. If the company succeeds, you will earn $1 trillion dollars, and there is a 20% chance of success. However, to get the company started, you must invest your entire life savings of $500,000, which will all be lost if the company fails. If we apply the calculus of decision theory, we will find that the expected value of this wager is $199,999,600,000. That's great--but how many will take this wager? The flaw of using expected value to guide decision making is the assumption that more is always better. Someone who is perfectly satisfied with $500,000 does not need to take a wager that will likely (80% chance) be financially destructive.
Applying the law of diminishing marginal utility to Pascal's Wager, we are no longer so awed by the concept of "infinite" reward. Why would one put up with doctrinal restrictions and institutional conformity in search of a possible reward when one is perfectly satisfied with life as it is?
The answer, of course, is the possibility of Hell; but since Pascal did not factor this into his wager, neither will I.
Some might point out that there are pluses to a religious life: community bonding, moral values, etc. Once again, however, these are not part of Pascal's formulation. Unlike many arguments presented against Pascal's Wager, my arguments is based entirely on decision theory within Pascal's framework. This is a logical criticism of Pascal's Wager, not one against Christian or religious belief in general. The wager, as it stands alone, is weak even within the framework Pascal establishes himself.
Pascal's Wager makes the following assumptions:
1) if God exists, He will reward those who believe in Him
2) God's reward is infinite
3) there is nothing to lose in believing in God
4) there is an equal chance of God existing and God not existing
With such assumptions we can derive the following calculus to find the expected value of this wager:
(reward x probability God exists) - (cost x probability God does not exist) = expected value of Pascal's Wager
Let reward be infinite and cost be zero. Even if assumption 4 is not true, the expected value will be infinite as long as the probability of God's existence is not zero. Hence it is rational, from the perspective of decision theory, to believe in God.
I will briefly sum up some noteworthy counter-arguments before offering my own. A common rebuttal criticizes the wager as a false dilemma in that it offers only the following possibilities:
1) a benevolent God exists and rewards according to belief
2) a benevolent God does not exist
This dichotomy precludes the possibilities that God is malevolent, or has an alternative system of reward. But as Pascal structures his analysis from a Christian viewpoint, this argument is moot.
Another criticism is that Pascal neglects to factor in all religions, and any possible religion, into this decision matrix. Since Pascal had obviously discounted the validity of all other religions, this argument does not serve to undermine Pascal's framework.
I seek to find errors in Pascal's Wager within his own established paradigm. After some brief analysis, I formulated the following premises:
1) the cost is not zero
2) the cost is not fixed
3) an infinite expected value automatically invokes the law of diminishing marginal utility
Premise 1
We will examine Premise 1 from a Christian perspective. There are few Christians that would deny the potential drawbacks of a Christian lifestyle. Doctrinal obedience places restrictions on potentially anything from diet to social conduct, depending on one's interpretation of the Bible. Furthermore, belief itself might exact a social cost in the form of religious persecution. While this is no longer as salient as during the founding years of Christianity, it still exists in areas of the Middle East, where conversion to non-Islamic religions provoke violence or even murder.
John Milton explicitly mentions the sacrifices of Christianity in Paradise Lost (I have not read the book. This tidbit of info I owe to Matthew Lu of Free Exchange):
"Of servitude, to serve whom God ordains, / Or Nature; God and Nature bid the same, / When he who rules worthiest, and excels / Them whom he governs. This is servitude."
Belief of God is servitude under God. This is cost.
Premise 2
In addition to the daily costs of Christian belief, we must factor in the opportunity cost: what one may gain if one does not believe in God. The opportunity cost of belief is variable. Since prevalent Christian doctrine makes no demands on the time of conversion, one may become choose belief at any point in one's lifetime to claim salvation.
If one enjoys behavior contrary to Christian doctrine (e.g. sodomy, adultery, and other fun things), then one would delay conversion until the last possible instant so as to minimize the opportunity cost. Therefore, precluding sudden deaths, there is no incentive in Pascal's framework to believe in God until one reaches the deathbed. Following the logic of decision theory, the wager Pascal construed as being supremely imperative essentially begs for procrastination.
Premise 3
Even if we accept both Premises 1 and 2, there is still the unaddressed question of the infinite expected value. No amount of trickery with cost and opportunity cost will produce a tangible effect on something infinite.
We therefore invoke the law of diminishing marginal utility. This law states that quantitative increase in an item of value will eventually reach a point where additional items will yield progressively less value.
Take for example a gift of roses. Although pragmatically wasteful, a bouquet of roses is lovely and symbolically meaningful. Two bouquets might be even better. Three bouquets is pushing it. By the time your romantic interest receives the ten thousandth bouquet of roses, he/she will be sick of them and throwing them away as soon as they are delivered.
We can create a new scenario to fit the form of a wager. Let us suppose you are asked to fund a fledgling company. If the company succeeds, you will earn $1 trillion dollars, and there is a 20% chance of success. However, to get the company started, you must invest your entire life savings of $500,000, which will all be lost if the company fails. If we apply the calculus of decision theory, we will find that the expected value of this wager is $199,999,600,000. That's great--but how many will take this wager? The flaw of using expected value to guide decision making is the assumption that more is always better. Someone who is perfectly satisfied with $500,000 does not need to take a wager that will likely (80% chance) be financially destructive.
Applying the law of diminishing marginal utility to Pascal's Wager, we are no longer so awed by the concept of "infinite" reward. Why would one put up with doctrinal restrictions and institutional conformity in search of a possible reward when one is perfectly satisfied with life as it is?
The answer, of course, is the possibility of Hell; but since Pascal did not factor this into his wager, neither will I.
Some might point out that there are pluses to a religious life: community bonding, moral values, etc. Once again, however, these are not part of Pascal's formulation. Unlike many arguments presented against Pascal's Wager, my arguments is based entirely on decision theory within Pascal's framework. This is a logical criticism of Pascal's Wager, not one against Christian or religious belief in general. The wager, as it stands alone, is weak even within the framework Pascal establishes himself.
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Integrity
Trying to uphold it is a lose-lose proposition in all situations. Unless you're religious and fervently believe in Heaven, I guess. In which case, you might want to prepare yourself for a rude surprise come Judgment Day, when you find out that there is no Heaven and you had spent your short, precious life living up to an invented ideal designed to brainwash you into becoming a good citizen. Nietzsche's Mad Man is running wild (see the paradox?).
In a certain philosophy discussion section I had a couple of weeks ago, we were simulating the Prisoner's Dilemma game, which is basically a puzzle that tests out different theories of cooperation (i.e., going back on pacts, ganging up on others, etc.). My group ended up dead last. Our only consolation? "We never screwed anyone over! We were the only ones that kept our word and our integrity!"
But it was not much consolation, because we were at -23 points by the end of the rounds. If we had been generals commanding armies at war, we would have ended up like Germany at the end of WWI. So much for trying to uphold integrity in this nonsensical world.
In a certain philosophy discussion section I had a couple of weeks ago, we were simulating the Prisoner's Dilemma game, which is basically a puzzle that tests out different theories of cooperation (i.e., going back on pacts, ganging up on others, etc.). My group ended up dead last. Our only consolation? "We never screwed anyone over! We were the only ones that kept our word and our integrity!"
But it was not much consolation, because we were at -23 points by the end of the rounds. If we had been generals commanding armies at war, we would have ended up like Germany at the end of WWI. So much for trying to uphold integrity in this nonsensical world.
Monday, October 26, 2009
Misanthropy
P.S. Edited, because I'm on my second round of procrastination tonight.
Violent bouts of misanthropy sometimes strike me late at night, especially when I'm browsing my Facebook News Feed. I don't even know why I'm "friends" with half of these people.
It's strange how easy it is to dislike people late at night. I sometimes feel a senseless urge to comment on people's walls, letting them know that they're 1) rude, 2) stupid, and 3) just plain ugly. However, my fear of confrontation usually smothers these urges neatly. Instead, I resort to passive resistance: I delete people from my Friends list. For fun.
I'm pretty sure this has to be some type of a psychological disorder.
Violent bouts of misanthropy sometimes strike me late at night, especially when I'm browsing my Facebook News Feed. I don't even know why I'm "friends" with half of these people.
It's strange how easy it is to dislike people late at night. I sometimes feel a senseless urge to comment on people's walls, letting them know that they're 1) rude, 2) stupid, and 3) just plain ugly. However, my fear of confrontation usually smothers these urges neatly. Instead, I resort to passive resistance: I delete people from my Friends list. For fun.
I'm pretty sure this has to be some type of a psychological disorder.
Thursday, October 15, 2009
On Changing Ideas
At this rate, I think Juan and I will eventually have to come to terms with the fact that we have become "grown-ups." Not in the sense that we are mature or responsible, but in the sense that each day we become more like the caricature of adults portrayed in the The Little Prince.
We have become realists. We have embraced Hobbes over Locke. We have, during egotistic and hedonistic pursuits, lost sight of what's important. The prince in our hearts is no longer Le Petit Prince, but Il Principe.
It is unfair, of course, for me to speak oh his behalf. But this is the trend I have observed: the loss of innocent love and steadfast belief in goodness.
I'm not sure if this progression is reversible. In fact, I don't think Antoine de Saint-Exupéry thought it possible. What is important, then, is to remember the fox's secret: that "It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye."
When I asked my 11-year-old pupil, after he had read The Little Prince, if he would ever like to grow up, he answered with an emphatic "no." It is too late for us. But if we can manage to keep the fox's secret close at hand, we can at least salvage what wisdom we had as children.
We have become realists. We have embraced Hobbes over Locke. We have, during egotistic and hedonistic pursuits, lost sight of what's important. The prince in our hearts is no longer Le Petit Prince, but Il Principe.
It is unfair, of course, for me to speak oh his behalf. But this is the trend I have observed: the loss of innocent love and steadfast belief in goodness.
I'm not sure if this progression is reversible. In fact, I don't think Antoine de Saint-Exupéry thought it possible. What is important, then, is to remember the fox's secret: that "It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye."
When I asked my 11-year-old pupil, after he had read The Little Prince, if he would ever like to grow up, he answered with an emphatic "no." It is too late for us. But if we can manage to keep the fox's secret close at hand, we can at least salvage what wisdom we had as children.
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